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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of Basel II, especially focusing on the Internal Rating Based
Approach. We present an economic model that analyzes the Internal Rating Based Approach. We found that Inter-
nal Rating Based Approach may induce banks to engage in “cherry picking” behavior, which may, in turn, increase
the overall risk level. We further show how Internal Rating Based Approach may alter the business conditions of
various economic agents and its effects on social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Since 2007, Basel II, the newly adopted international standard of bank regulation, has replaced the 1988 Basel Accord.
The key difference between Basel II and the 1988 Basel Accord is that Basel II adopts the Internal Rating Based
Approach (IRBA) which allows each bank to use its own internal model and information to measure the risk weights
of its investment assets. This paper focuses on the effect of the IRBA on the credit market.
First, we examine the effectiveness of the IRBA in reducing the risk level of banks’ investments. The main
purpose of bank regulation is to deter banks from taking excessive risks. We argue that the IRBA may invoke the
banks tocherry pickthe high-risk borrowers among the borrowers with same credit rating by screening out the low-
risk borrowers, which may in turn increase the overall risk level of banks’ investment portfolios.
Cherry picking behavior of banks refers to practices that shift a bank’s portfolio toward the riskier of two loans
when supervisors give both loans a same risk weights(Stevens, 2000). This Cherry picking behavior may occur for
two reasons.
The first reason is because of information asymmetry between banks and regulatory agency. If banks have more
information about the loans than the regulatory agency, they can cherry pick the riskier ones from the same risk bucket.
This first reason has been analyzed by Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Rochet (1992).
They showed that if risk weights are not correctly calculated, banks can actually take more risks. Calculating risk
weights correctly means that riskier asset is given a higher risk weights, and without the private information of banks,
regulatory agency may put assets with different risk levels in a same risk bucket.1
The second reason, which is newly mentioned in this paper, is the screening device that banks have. Banks can
always screen out less desirable borrowers with various screening devices, even when they have no more information
than the regulatory agency. As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed, banks can screen low-risk borrowers by adjusting
interest rates. Other terms in debt covenants can also be used as a screening device. Therefore, unless the regulatory
agency take account of all possible screening devices, calculating risk weight correctly may not be possible.
The existence of screening device is the key reason that deters the IRBA from decreasing the overall risk level.
Since IRBA is a truth telling mechanism that induces banks to reveal their private information, it would eliminate or
at least alleviate the first reason of banks’ cherry picking behavior.
However, the second reason still remain unsolved because although banks may have revealed their private infor-
mation, they can still utilize screening devices to Cherry pick the high-risk borrowers. Therefore, Cherry picking
problem can be aggravated. If the burden of regulation is solely borne by the unsophisticated banks that cannot af-
ford IRBA, those unsophisticated banks would try to cherry pick the high-risk borrowers to pass on the burden to
borrowers. We show that in some cases, this effect would be overwhelming.
Second, we examine the effects of the IRBA on different types of lenders and borrowers. We analyze the various
effects of the IRBA on good credit type and bad credit type borrowers. We also examine how sophisticated banks,
which can afford to implement the IRBA, and unsophisticated banks, which cannot, may face different business
conditions after the adoption of Basel II.
The main idea of IRBA is to reduce the burden of regulation when banks can verify that they have invested in
1A similar point has been argued by Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) and Freixas and Rochet (1998). However, these two works study
the methods of designing a fairly priced incentive compatible deposit insurance contract (a truth telling mechanism) that would induce banks
to reveal their hidden information. IRBA is also a truth-telling mechanism.
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a safe asset. The benefit of the reduction of regulatory burden would be shared among the banks and the investees.
Those would be the sophisticated banks and good credit type borrowers. However, the unsophisticated banks that
cannot afford IRBA would have no choice but to accommodate those bad credit type borrowers and the whole burden
of regulation would be shared among the unsophistcated banks and bad credit borrowers. Therefore, their business
condition would be aggravated.
Some other academic works (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2005; Repullo and Suarez, 2004; and Rime, 2003) focused
on the IRBA of Basel II. Hakenes and Schnabel (2005) is the most closely related work to this paper. They pointed out
the problem with the optionality of adopting the IRBA. Their works assume that sophisticated banks and unsophisti-
cated banks share the same information about the borrowers. However, the key feature of the IRBA is its permission
for the banks to use their private information, which is not observable by outsiders. Therefore, their work do not
show the key difference between the IRBA and a risk-sensitive Standard Approach (SA). This paper assumes that the
sophisticated banks and unsophisticated banks have asymmetric information.2
Section 2 introduces the basic model that we use and Section 3 shows a simple benchmark case that explicitly
solves for the loan market equilibrium when there are two types of borrowers in the model of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). Section 4 analyzes the main effects of the IRBA. Section 5 studies the welfare effects and presents some
policy recommendations that can maximize social welfare. Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2 The Model
The model we construct is a modified version of the one analyzed in Stiglitz and Weiss(1981). There is a continuum
of borrowers whose size is 2. Each borrower is characterized by the type of project he has. There are two types of
projects,high-risk and low-risk. We identify the type of the borrower by the type of the project, denoted byθ: if
θ = H, the borrower is a high-risk type and ifθ = L, the borrower is a low risk type. Ifθ = i, the project succeeds
with a probabilityPi and a returnRi wherei ∈ {H,L}. If it fails, the return is zero. The high-risk project is a mean
preserving spread of the low-risk project:PHRH = PLRL, whereRH > RL > 1 andPH < PL. The population of
high-risk types and low-risk types is 1 each. Each project requires a lump sum investment of 1.
The risk type (θ) is a private information of the borrower, which is not observable by the lenders. However, the
lender observes a signal,s, which provides imperfect information about the borrower’s type. In the real world, this
signal can be interpreted as a credit rating. We denote the borrower withs = G as agood credit typeand the borrower
with s = B as abad credit type, respectively. The probability of observing a good signal when the borrower is a low-
risk type (θ = L) is α and the probability of observing a bad signal when the borrower is a high-risk type(θ = H) is
alsoα:
Pr[s = G|θ = L] = Pr[s = B|θ = H] = α
2Several theoretical papers (Lowe, 2004; Danı́elsson, Shin, and Zigrand, 2004; and Kashyap and Stein, 2004) have discussed the macroe-
conomic effect of Basel II, especially with a focus on the procyclicality and the fact that Basel II does not take account of the endogeneity of
financial risks. The main argument of these works is that Basel II uses the VAR model to estimate the amount of risks that banks are taking.
Since almost every bank uses a similar VAR model to calculate the risk level, a single moderate shock on the economy can stimulate banks’
selling of their assets and a macroeconomic downturn.
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We assume that1 > α > 12 , which implies that the signals provides imperfect information about the risk type of
the borrower.
A slight abuse of the law of larger numbers implies thatα fraction of the borrowers has( , θ) = (G, L), α fraction
of the borrowers has(s, θ) = (B,H), 1− α fraction of the borrowers has( , θ) = (G, H), and1− α fraction of the
borrowers has(s, θ) = (B,L). Therefore, the market is segmented by the signals. We call the market for the good
credit types, thegood credit marketand the market for the bad credit types, thebad credit market.
The borrower’s payoff isΦ(s, θ) = Pθ(Rθ−rs), wherers is the (gross) interest rate charged on the borrower with
signals. The borrower of type(s, θ) will borrow if and only if Φ(s, θ) ≥ 0, that is,rs ≤ Rθ. WhenrG ∈ [1, RL], the
demand for the loan in the good credit market is 1 and whenrG ∈ (RL, RH ], the demand is1−α. WhenrB ∈ [1, RL],
the demand for the loan in the bad credit market is 1 and whenrB ∈ (RL, RH ], the demand isα. Therefore, the lender
can screen out the low-risk type by chargingrs ∈ (RL, RH ] or pool them by chargingrs ∈ [1, RL].
There is a continuum of lenders whose size is also 2. The amount of capital each lender can lend is 1. The unique
feature of the present model as compared to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is that the lenders incur the cost of capital,c,
which is distributed uniformly on[1, 2]. Let P (s, rs) be the probability of the project’s success of the borrower with
signals when the interest rate charged on the borrower isrs. The expected profit of the lender with the cost of capital
c is πsc = P (s, rs)(rs)− c, when lending to the borrower with signals.3
If the interest rate charged satisfiesrs ∈ [1, RL], then both types of borrowers borrow in markets, and the
success probability of the project is given byP (G, rG) = P = (1 − α)PH + αPL in the good credit market and
P (B, rB) = P = (1− α)PL + αPH in the bad credit market, respectively.4
If the interest rate charged satisfiesrs ∈ (RL, RH ], then only borrowers of typeH borrow in markets and the
success probability of the project isPH in that market.
3 Benchmark Case
As a benchmark, we analyze a simple case in which every borrower produces the same signal. Assume that the size of
borrowers is 1 and letβ be the proportion of high-risk type borrowers andr be the interest rate imposed on borrowers.
As we have seen in the previous section, both types of borrowers borrow whenr ∈ [1, RL], and the probability of
the project’s successP (r) is P̂ = (1− β)PL + βPH . If r ∈ (RL, RH ], then only typeH borrowers borrow and the
probability of the project’s successP (r) is PH . Note thatP̂ > PH .
Assume that the population of the lenders is 1. The expected profit of the lender with costc is πc = P (r)r − c.
Since the cost on capitalc is uniformly distributed on[1, 2], the supply of capital isx = P (r)r − 1.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the loan market is characterized as follows.
1. 1 ≤ P̂RL − 1, thenr∗ = 2P̂ and the loan amount is 1.
2. β ≤ P̂RL − 1 < 1, thenr∗ = RL and credit rationing occurs with the loan amount ofP̂RL − 1 which is
strictly smaller than 1 but greater thanβ.
3If πsc ≥ 0 (i.e. c ≤ P (s, rs)rs), then the lender would lend capital. Therefore, the amount of loan supply would beP (s, rs)rs−1 because
the cost of capital is uniformly distributed in[1, 2]. Note that the amount of loan supply equals the profit of a lender whose cost of capital is 1.
4We adopt the tie-breaking rule that the borrower borrows when he is indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing
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3. P̂RL − 1 < β ≤ PHRH − 1, thenr∗ = 1+βPH and the loan amount isβ.
4. PHRH −1 < β, thenr∗ = RH and credit rationing occurs with the loan amount ofPHRH −1 which is strictly
smaller thanβ.
Proof. Notice that the demand for the loan is given by1 for r ∈ [1, RL] andβ for r ∈ (RL, RH ]. Similarly the
supply for the loan is given bŷPr − 1 if r ∈ [1, RL] andPHr − 1 if r ∈ (RL, RH ].
We first solve for the equilibrium ignoring the possibility of credit rationing. The equilibrium condition for
r ∈ [1, RL] is P̂ r − 1 = 1 and the condition for ∈ (RL, RH ] is PHr − 1 = β. Hencer∗ = 2P̂ and the equilibrium
loan amount is 1 whenr∗ ∈ [1, RL] andr∗ = 1+βPH and the equilibrium loan amount isβ whenr
∗ ∈ (RL, RH ]. The
conditionr∗ = 2
P̂
∈ [1, RL] is rewritten asP̂RL − 1 ≥ 1 and the conditionr∗ = 1+βPH ∈ (RL, RH ] is rewritten as
PHRL − 1 < β ≤ PHRH − 1 for future references.
We now take account of the possibility of credit rationing. WhenP̂RL − 1 ≥ 1, the equilibrium loan is 1 for
r∗ = 2
P̂
; borrowers of both types are supplied the loan at the market equilibrium and the market clears and hence it is
an equilibrium.
If P̂RL − 1 < 1, then the demand for the loan remains 1 forr∗ ∈ [1, RL], while the supply is less than 1 since
P̂ r∗ − 1 < 1 even forr∗ = RL; there is excess demand. Under this circumstance, the lenders may raise the interest
rate so that the market clears at a higher interest rate or the lenders may exercise credit rationing atr∗ = RL. Credit
rationing occurs if the supply at the interest rater∗ = RL is greater than the supply at the interest rate higher thanRL
which isβ:
P̂RL − 1 ≥ β.
Remember that the loan market with only high-risk type borrowers clears at the interest rater∗ = 1+βPH if PHRL−
1 < β ≤ PHRH − 1. SinceP̂RL − 1 ≤ PHRH − 1, the equilibrium withr∗ = 1+βPH , which is not credit rationed,
holds whenP̂RL − 1 < β. Hence the credit rationing equilibrium with the interest rater∗ = RL and the equilibrium
loan amount ofP̂RL − 1 occurs if1 > P̂RL − 1 ≥ β.
If P̂RL− 1 < β, then the loan market equilibrium is given by the interest rate∗ = 1+βPH and the equilibrium loan
amount ofβ. However, this equilibrium ceases to hold ifPHRH − 1 < β since the demand for loan isβ while the
supply isPHr∗ − 1, which is smaller thanβ. Hence the loan market equilibrium with the interest rate∗ = 1+βPH and
the equilibrium loan amount ofβ occurs ifP̂RL − 1 < β ≤ PHRH − 1.
Finally credit rationing occurs with only high-risk type borrowers ifPHRH − 1 < β; the equilibrium interest rate
is RH and the loan amount isPHRH − 1.
Collecting the results completes the proof.
The proposition explicitly solves for the loan market equilibrium when there are two types of borrowers in the
model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As is well known, the loan market equilibrium may be characterized by credit
rationing since raising the interest rate may alter the pool of loan applicants into becoming riskier.
Corollary 1 r ∈ [1, RL) or r ∈ (RL, RH), then the market is cleared. However, ifr = RL or r = RH , then the
market is not cleared and credit rationing occurs.
The proof of this corollary is straightforward from Proposition 1.
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4 Internal Rating Based Approach
Now, suppose that there are two types of lenders. One type of lender can observe the signals and the other type
cannot observe the signals. We call a lender who can observe the signals, an Informed Lenderand the one who
cannot observe, aUninformed Lender. Assume that the observing ability is independent of the cost of capital and the
population of the informed lenders and uninformed lenders is 1 each. Also, assume that the observing ability is also
observable by the borrowers so that the uninformed lender cannot pretend to be an informed lender. The informed
lenders can be interpreted as sophisticated banks that can afford to implement the IRBA whereas the uninformed
lenders represent unsophisticated banks that have no choice but to adopt the SA.
Before starting the analysis, we define some actions that the lenders can take. If a lender in the good credit market
moves to the bad credit market and follows the strategy of the lenders in the bad credit market or vice versa, we call
this action“change the market”. If a lender who screens out the low risk types starts pooling both types by lowering
the interest rate or vice versa within the same market, we call this action“switch the action”.
Suppose the regulation agency imposes a high minimum capital ratio or high deposit insurance fee on the lenders
who enter the bad credit market. These kinds of regulations increases the capital cost of lenders. This is the main
feature of any risk-sensitive prudential regulation, imposingregulatory tax, which increases cost of capital, on risky
investment.5 Then the capital cost of those who enter the bad credit market will increase. Assume that the regulatory
tax is δ > 0 for any lender who enters the bad credit market or those who cannot verify that they entered the good
credit market. Therefore, uninformed lenders always have to bear the regulatory tax,δ. This means that the lender
whose cost of capital isc, when entering the good credit market, will have to bear the cost of capitalc + δ, when
entering the bad credit market.
4.1 The equilibria
Let ΨI andΨU be the strategy of informed lenders and uninformed lenders, respectively. The strategies that informed
lenders can pursue is a vector of two elements,ΨI = (aG, aB), whereas ∈ {S, P, N}. S is screening,P is pool-
ing, N is not entering, andas is an action that is taken in thes market. ΨI = (S, P ) means that informed lenders
screen in the good credit market and pool in the bad credit market. Therefore there are eight possible strategies for
informed lenders because,(N,N) surely is not an equilibrium. The strategies that uninformed lenders can take can
be expressed by a single element,a, wherea ∈ {S, P}. For the strategies,(ΨI ,ΨU ) to be nash-equilibrium, they must
satisfy the following conditions.
a) Higher profit condition: Note that the informed lenders can mimic the uninformed lenders while uninformed
lenders cannot mimic the informed. Therefore, the profit of the informed lenders should be as large as or greater than
the uninformed lenders’ profit. We call this condition a Higher profit condition.
b) Impossibility of Intramarket Arbitrage Condition: Impossibility of Intramarket Arbitrage Condition (Intramar-
ket Condition) means that the lenders cannot make more profit just by switching from screening to pooling or vice
5Note that, the regulatory tax does not mean that regulatory agency, in fact, tax the banks but, an analogy used to capture the effect of the
increase in capital cost by regulation.
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versa within the same market they are involved in. If they cannot make more profit, they would have no incentive to
switch the action.
c) Impossibility of Intermarket Arbitrage condition: Impossibility of Intermarket Arbitrage Condition (Intermar-
ket Condition) means that the lenders in the good credit market and the lenders in the bad credit market should have
equal profit so that they cannot make arbitrage profit just by changing the market as long as they are homogeneous.
For example, if informed lenders enter both markets, no matter which market they enter, the profits should be equal.
However, this does not mean that informed lenders’ profit must be equal to the uninformed lenders’ profit in the
opposite market. Intermarket condition only holds among the homogeneous lenders.
Before, analyzing the equilibria, we first examine which strategies cannot be an equilibrium, i.e., which are the
strategies that do not satisfy the above three conditions. There are eight possible strategies for informed lenders,
becauseΨI = (N,N) surely cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The interest rate set by uninformed lenders cannot be lower than the interest rate set by informed lenders.
Proof. Suppose the interest rate set by uninformed lenders is lower, then since uninformed lenders cannot dis-
tinguish good credit types from bad credit types, every borrower would go to uninformed lenders. It will cause the
informed lenders to lower interest rate. Therefore, it would not be an equilibrium for sure.
First, consider the strategiesΨI = (N,S) or (N,P ). Because of the regulatory tax, informed lenders can always
save cost of capital by entering the good credit market. Therefore, those two strategies would not be equilibria.
Lemma 2 Informed lenders always enter the good credit market. Therefore,ΨI = (N,S) andΨI = (N,P ) are not
equilibria.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing thatΨI = (N,S) andΨI = (N,P ) are not equilibria.
If informed lenders pool in the bad credit market, sinceP > P , informed lenders can make an arbitrage profit by
entering the good market. Therefore,(N,P ) breaks the intermarket condition.
Suppose informed lenders screen out in the bad credit market (ΨI = (N,S)). If uninformed lenders impose a
lower interest rate, it contradicts Lemma 1. If uninformed borrowers impose a higher or equal interest, their profit
would be higher so it will break the higher profit condition. Therefore, it proves the lemma.
Now, consider the strategy,ΨI = (S, P ). It means that the interest rate in the good credit market is higher.
However, since the probability of success when the borrowers are pooled in the good market (P ) is higher than the
probability of success in the bad market (P ), if borrowers are pooled in the bad market, informed lenders would also
pool in the good market. Therefore,ΨI = (S, P ) is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The interest rate in the bad credit market has to be higher than or equal to the interest rate in the good
credit market. Therefore,ΨI = (S, P ) cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. We consider two possible cases: first, when informed lenders enter both market and second, when
informed lenders only enter the good market.
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Suppose the informed lenders enter both markets, then the profits from both markets have to be equal owing to
intermarket condition and the interest rate in the bad credit market has to be higher because of the regulatory tax.
Suppose the informed lenders only enter the good credit market (ΨI = (S, N) or ΨI = (P,N)), then, if unin-
formed lenders set a lower interest rate, it will break Lemma 1. Therefore, uninformed lenders have to set a higher
or equal interest rate which would be the interest rate in the bad credit market. This eliminates the informed lenders’
strategy(S, P ).
Lastly, we consider the strategyΨI = (P, P ).
Lemma 4 The uninformed lenders cannot enter the good credit market.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the interest rate in the bad credit market has to be higher than or equal to the interest
rate in the good credit market. We consider two feasible cases: first, when the interest rate in the bad credit market is
higher and second, when the interest rates are equal.
Suppose the interest rate is higher in the bad credit market and also assume that the uninformed lenders set the
interest equal to the interest in the good credit market, then it would contradict Lemma 1. Therefore, the uninformed
lenders will set the interest equal to the bad credit market in the equilibrium.
Suppose the interest rates are equal. The profit from the bad credit market must be lower because of the regulatory
tax. If some informed lenders enter the good credit market or some uninformed lenders enter the good credit market,
or both, then, either higher profit condition or the intermarket condition is broken.
Lemma 4 eliminates the informed lenders’ strategy(P, P ). Suppose the informed lenders pool in both markets.
The profits in both markets should be the same because of the intermarket condition. However, sinceP > P , in order
to make the profits equal, the interest rate in the good credit market has to be lower. If the interest rate is lower than
RL, the supply of capital has to be 1 at the equilibrium, and the good credit market has to be cleared by Corollary 1. If
the amount of capital supplied is 1, it means that some of the capital supplied in the good credit market is supplied by
the uninformed lender because the maximum possible capital supply by the informed lenders, when loan applicants
are pooled, isPRL − 1 < 1. It contradicts Lemma 4.
We have proven that(N,S), (N,P ), (P, P ), and(S, P ) are not equilibria. Now we show that rest of the strategies
are equilibria and the conditions under which, they are equilibria. We also find the equilibrium interest rates.
Proposition 2 The equilibria are as follows.
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Regulatory Tax(δ) rG rB ΨI ΨU
Case 1.α < PRL − 1
a) δ ≤ (PRL − 1)− α RL RL (P,N) P
b) (PRL − 1)− α < δ < (PHRH − 1)− α RL 1+α+δPH (P,N) S
c) δ ≥ (PHRH − 1)− α RL RH (P,N) S
Case 2.0.5 ≤ PRL − 1 ≤ α
a) δ < PHRH − PRL RL PRL+δPH (P, S) S
b) δ ≥ PHRH − PRL RL RH (P,N) S
Case 3.1− α ≤ PRL − 1 < 0.5




b) (PHRH − 1)− 0.5 ≤ δ < PHRH − PRL RH − δPH RH (S, S) S
c) δ ≥ PHRH − PRL RL RH (P,N) S
Case 4.PRL − 1 < 1− α




b) (PHRH − 1)− 0.5 ≤ δ ≤ (PHRH − 1)− (1− α) RH − δPH RH (S, S) S
c) δ > PHRH − 1− (1− α) min(RH , 2−αPH ) RH (S, N) S
Proof. The above lemmas show that(N,S), (N,P ), (P, P ), and(S, P ) are not equilibria. Now we show that
(S, N), (P,N), (S, S), and(P, S) are equilibria and find the conditions on which they are. The rest of the proof is
shown in the Appendix.
Note thatPRL − 1 is the profit of a lender who pools solely in the good market and whose cost of capital is 1.
1− α andα are the net profit of a lender who screens in the bad marker and good market respectively. As mentioned
in footnote 3, these are also the amount of loan supply.
Case 1 is when pooling in the good market gives more profit than screening in the bad market. In this case,
informed lenders do not enter the bad market, so the increase in the regulatory tax does not affect the informed
lenders’ strategy. However, the increase of regulatory tax would turn the uninformed lenders’ strategy from pooling
to screening.
Case 2 is when screening in the bad market gives more profit than pooling in the good market, so more informed
lenders would move from the good market to the bad market, decreasing the interest rate in the bad market (PRL+δPH )
until the profits in both markets are equal. As regulatory tax increases, lenders in the bad market increases interest
rate to transfer the burden of regulation on to the borrowers. However, when the interest rate in the bad market hits
the ceiling (RH ), lenders in the bad market cannot transfer the burden of regulation by increasing interest rate and the
informed lenders cannot make as much profit in the bad market as in the good market. Therefore, they leave the bad
market.
Case 3 and 4 are the cases when screening in both markets gives more profit than pooling in the good market. If
informed lenders screen in both markets, their profits from both markets should be equal because of the intermarket
condition, but there are more demand in the bad market. Therefore, more informed lenders in the good market would
move to bad market and the interest rate in the good market would increase while the interest rate in the bad market
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would decrease until the profits from both markets are equalized. By Corollary 1, the demand (1 = α + (1 − α))
equals the supply (2 PHrG − 1) = 2(PHrB − 1− δ)) and the profit equals0.5.
The difference between Case 3 and Case 4 is that in Case 3,ΨI = (P,N) earns more profit thanΨI = (S, N).
Therefore, when the increase in the regulatory tax makes the informed lender to leave the bad market, in Case 3, they
pool in the good market whereas in Case 4, they screen.
4.2 Cherry picking behavior
In Case 1 of Proposition 2, when the regulatory tax is small and the revenue from pooling in the bad market is high,
the uninformed lenders would pool in the bad market. However, as the regulatory tax increases, the uninformed
lenders increase the interest rate to pass on the burden of regulatory tax to the borrowers and at certain threshold level
(((PRL − 1) − δ)), uninformed lenders switch from pooling to screening. This increase in the interest rate changes
the pool of loan applicants into becoming riskier which means that the uninformed lenders switch from pooling to
screening. Therefore, the regulatory tax may induce the lenders to take more risks, resulting in more bank failures.
Proposition 3 An increase in regulatory tax can increase the ratio of failure in Case 1.
Proof. It can be easily verified that if the ratio of the high-risk type increases, the failure rate also increases.
Let hi be the ratio of the high-risk type in Case 1(1 + α < PRL) wherei ∈ {a, b, c}. ha is the ratio of high-risk
type when a) δ ≤ PRL − 1 + α, hb when b) PRL − (1 + α) < δ < PHRH − (1 + α), hc when c)
δ ≥ PHRH − (1 + α). a, b, c correspond to a), b), and c) of Case 1. Also letδa = δ in a) of Case 1,δb = δ in b)
andδc = δ in c).









. Note that,dhadδa =
(1−2α)(PRL−1)
(PRL−1+PRL−1−δa)2
< 0. In case a), asδa increases, the ratio of




< hb. Therefore, ifδ exceeds the critical point (δ = PRL −














PRL − (1 + α) PHRH − (1 + α) δ
h
Pooling - Screening
Figure 1: The effect of regulatory tax on the ratio of high-risk types,h, when1 + α < PRL.
In case 1, the uninformed lenders do not screen out when the regulatory tax is low, i.e.δ ≤ PRL − (1 + α).
However, when the regulatory tax increases above the critical point (PRL − (1 + α)), the uninformed lenders start to
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screen out in order to pass on the burden of the regulatory tax to the borrowers. From this point, only the high-risk
types borrow from the uninformed lenders. This increases the ratio of high-risk types and the overall failure rate.
This phenomenon can be interpreted as a type of cherry picking behavior. Federal Reserve Board defines cherry
picking behavior as :
Cherry picking refers to practices that shift a bank’s portfolio toward the riskier of two loans when su-
pervisors would put both loans in the same “risk bucket”. Banks have an incentive to accommodate the
credit needs of high-quality borrowers in ways that avoid straight loans in order to achieve a lower weight
(Stevens, 2000).
As far as we know, previous theoretical works have pointed out this problem explicitly or implicitly from the viewpoint
of the hidden information of banks. They argued that the cherry picking problem occurs because of the information
asymmetry between banks and regulatory agencies.
Some have mentioned that under full information, regulatory agencies can solve the cherry picking problem by
calculating the risk weights correctly (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; and Rochet, 1992).6
Since then, some have analyzed the truth-telling mechanism that can induce banks to reveal their private information
(Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992; and Freixas and Rochet, 1998).
In this case, IRBA has made the banks to truthfully reveal their private information. However, Cherry picking
problem remained unsolved. If lenders have a screening device such as interest rate, correctly calculating risk weights
(regulatory tax) may not be possible. Of course, the regulatory agency can measure the risk weights based on the
credit rate as well as the interest rates. However, the lenders have other means of screening apart from the interest
rate such as period of repayment, collateral, etc. In fact, every term in the debt covenant can be used as a screening
device. Therefore, unless regulatory agencies take account of every possible screening device, calculating risk weights
correctly may not be possible.
Corollary 2 In case 2 and 3, the regulatory tax reduces the failure rate.
Proof. Proof omitted.
In case 2 and 3, when the regulatory tax increases over a critical point (PHRH −PRL < δ), the informed lenders
move away from the bad credit market and enter the good credit market. At this point, the informed lenders cannot
transfer the regulatory tax on to the borrowers. Therefore, they leave the bad credit market.
This increases the supply of capital in the good credit market and reduces the interest rate, which means that
the informed lenders have to switch from screening to pooling in the good credit market. Therefore, the failure rate
decreases.
4.3 Effects of the IRBA
In case 2, 3, and 4, when the increase of regulatory tax is low, lenders transfer the burden of regulatory tax on to
the borrowers by raising the interest rate. However, there exists a ceiling for the interest rate in the bad market so a
limitation exists on transferring the burden of regulatory tax on to the borrowers. Therefore, if the regulatory tax is
6In this model, calculating risk weight is analogous to calculating regulatory tax,δ.
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above a certain threshold, informed lenders will leave the bad credit market. When informed lenders leave the bad
credit market, they block out the uninformed lenders from entering the good credit market by setting lower interest
rate. Since the uninformed lenders cannot observe the signal that the borrowers generate, they cannot mimic the
informed lenders.
Basel II allows banks to use the IRBA. If sophisticated banks use the internal model to evaluate the risk weights,
these banks can act as the informed lenders. Since the sophisticated banks, which can afford the internal model, can
reduce the cost of capital, they will induce good credit types by offering low interest rates. In this case, the bad credit
types have no choice but to accommodate the unsophisticated banks that cannot afford the internal model.
Overall, Basel II regulation deepens the disparity between the bad market and the good credit market and the
disparity between the informed lenders and the uninformed lenders. If the informed lenders transfer from the bad
credit market to the good credit market, the supply in the good credit market increases. As supply increases, the
interest rate goes down. On the other hand, the supply in the bad credit market decreases and the interest rate goes
up in the bad credit market. Therefore, the difference in the interest rates and the amounts of loans supplied between
these two markets becomes even greater.
Proposition 4 The IRBA has more severe effects on the bad credit borrowers and the uninformed lenders as compared
to the good credit borrowers and informed lenders.
In January 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a second consultative paper (BIS, 2001).
This 2001 proposal stimulated much controversy. More than 250 comments have been made on this proposal. Among
the comments, quite many argued that the treatment for loans to small- and medium-size enterprises is foreseen to be
too severe (Fabi, Laviola and Reedtz, 2003). This shows that the Basel II can be adverse to bad credit borrowers. Also
Berger (2006) argues that the bifurcated system can have significantly adverse effects on the competitive position of
large non-IRBA banks. These empirical result confirm Proposition 4. This paper shows that the uninformed lenders
and bad credit borrowers are adversely affected by the bifurcated system, the IRBA.
5 Welfare Analysis
Now suppose that the bank failure causes social cost,σ. 7 Let W be the social welfare andx, the amount of loan lent.
Also letω = PHRH = PLRL. Let xi = xHi + x
L
i , wherexi is the amount of capital lent to the informed lenders,x
H
i
is the amount lent by the informed lenders to the high-risk types, andxLi is the amount lent by the informed lenders
to the low-risk types. Also letxu = xHu + x
L
u where,xu is the amount lent by the uninformed lenders,x
H
u is the
amount lent by the uninformed lenders to the high-risk types, andxLu is the amount lent by the informed lenders to
the low-risk types.







2 − xi − xu
−(1− PH)xHi σ − (1− PL)xLi σ − (1− PH)xHu σ − (1− PL)xLuσ
7If there is no social cost associated with bank failure, the social welfare would decrease as regulatory tax increases because it would only
reduce the loan amount.
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Note that the first line of the equation is the total revenue minus the total cost that the lenders take privately. The




































From the above equation, we can find three facts about the effect of regulatory tax on social welfare.
First, the IRBA allows inefficient sophisticated banks with a high capital cost to stay in the business while
crowding out relatively efficient unsophsticated banks with low capital cost. The higher profit condition requires
ω ≥ xi + 1 ≥ xu + 1. Also it can be easily verified from Proposition 4 thatdxudδ ≤
dxi
dδ ≤ 0. Therefore,
(ω − xu − 1)
dxu
dδ




Because of the higher profit condition, the marginal surplus from the informed lenders is lower than the unin-
formed lenders. However, regulatory tax reduces the amount supplied by uninformed lenders more than informed
lenders. Therefore, even more uninformed lenders with relatively low private cost will be out of business and the
informed lenders with relatively high private cost will stay. This factor can be considered a loss of social welfare
caused by the IRBA.
Second, the increase of regulatory tax would increase the social welfare when the loan amount is sufficiently large.







) is negative,dWdδ would be positive and vice versa whenxj is small.
The marginal private cost of capital increases with the amount of loan lent whereas, the marginal revenue,ω =
PHRH = PLRL, is constant. Therefore, when marginal private cost is low so that the revenue can compensate for
the private cost and the social cost, regulatory tax inefficiently reduces the amount of loan lent. However, when the
amount of capital lent is large and therefore, the private cost is large, regulatory tax only reduces the social welfare.
Third, if prudential regulation decreases the amount of loan lent to the high-risk types, the prudential regulation has
positive effects on social welfare. Notice that becausexHj + x
L













is a weighted average between(1 − PH)σ and (1 − PL)σ. Note that(1 − PH)σ > (1 − PL)σ.
Therefore, if prudential regulation reduces the amount of capital lent to the high-risk types more as compared to the
amount of capital lent to the low-risk types, the regulatory tax would have a positive effect on social welfare. It is
because high-risk types generate more social cost.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of Basel II, especially focusing on the IRBA. We found following results. First, we
found that the IRBA may increase the risk level of investment in some cases. In the earlier theoretical works, the
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possibility of such cases was studied. In these works,it was due to the information asymmetry between banks and the
regulatory agency.
In this paper, however, such cases may occur even when the IRBA has solved the information asymmetry problem.
When banks have a screening device, they can utilize that screening device to choose the riskier borrowers within the
same credit rating. In this case, unless, the regulatory agency takes account of every possible screening device,
calculating risk weights (regulatory tax) correctly may not be possible.
Second, we found that unsophisticated banks that cannot afford the IRBA, cannot enter the good market and have
no choice but to accommodate the bad credit types. The sophisticated banks, which can afford the internal model, will
induce good credit type borrowers by offering low interest rates to avoid regulatory burden. In this case, the bad credit
type borrowers have no choice but to go to the unsophisticated banks. Therefore, sophisticated banks and good credit
type borrowers may face a better business condition while the unsophisticated banks and bad credit type borrowers
may face harsher business conditions.
Appendix
1. The informed lenders only enter the good credit market and screen out the low-risk types,ΨI = (S, N).
Since the informed lenders screen out, the uninformed lenders must screen out because of Lemma 1. There exist
four possible equilibria. First,rG ∈ (RL, RH) andrB ∈ (RL, RH). Second,rG ∈ (RL, RH) andrB = RH . Third,
rG = RH andrB = RH . Fourth,rG = RH andrB ∈ (RL, RH). However, the fourth possibility (rG = RH and
rB ∈ (RL, RH)) is not possible because of Lemma 3.
i) rG ∈ (RL, RH) and rB ∈ (RL, RH)
The uninformed lenders cannot enter the good credit market because of Lemma 4 and the interest rate set by the
uninformed lenders has to be higher than that set by the informed lenders because of Lemma 1. Therefore, all the bad
credit types will go to the uninformed lender and good credit types will go to the informed lenders.
We know that both markets are cleared by Corollary 1. By market clearing conditions, we haverG = 2−αPH and
rB = 1+α+δPH . The profit in the good credit market is2−α− c whereas the profit in the bad credit market is1+α− c.
This result contradicts the higher profit condition. Therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium.
ii) rG ∈ (RL, RH) and rB = RH
The uninformed lenders set the interest rate toRH by Lemma 1. In this case, the interest rate in the good credit
market is 2−αPH by Corollary 1 and market clearing condition. The informed lenders’ profit is2 − α − c and the
uninformed lenders profit isPHRH − c− δ. To satisfy the higher profit condition,
PHRH − c− δ < 2− α− c
δ > PHRH − (2− α)
Now, we check the intramarket condition. It is trivial that the intramarket condition is satisfied in the bad credit
market. The profit the informed lenders can earn in the good market, if they switch, isPRL − c. Therefore, the
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intramarket condition in the good credit market is
PRL − c < 2− α− c
PRL < 2− α




2− α < PHRH
Lastly, the bad credit market should not be cleared. However, sinceδ > PHRH−(2−α), the supplyPHRH−1−δ









































s = G s = B
α1− α
rG
Figure 2: Market Equilibrium WhenPRL < 2− α < PHRH andδ > PHRH − (2− α)
iii) rG = RH and rB = RH
It can be easily verified that this case is identical to ii) except for the condition that2 − α < PHRH is changed
to 2− α ≥ PHRH .
2. The informed lenders only enter the good credit market and pool,ΨI = (P,N).
Since the informed lenders only enter the good credit market and pool, their profit isPRL − c. If the informed
lenders switch to screening, the informed lenders’ profit would bemin(PHRH − c, 2−α− c) depending on whether
the market is cleared or not. To satisfy the intramarket condition,
min(PHRH − c, 2− α− c) ≤ PRL − c
2− α ≤ PRL
The uninformed lenders have three choices: setrB = RL, rB ∈ (RL, RH), or rB = RH by Lemma 3 and 4.
i) rB = RL
Although the interest rates in both markets are equal, all the good credit types will go to the informed lender
and all the bad credit types will go to the uninformed lenders. Note that the supply by informed lenders will be
14
PRL − 1. Since the uninformed lenders have to bear the increase of cost of capital andP < P , the capital supply by
the uninformed lenders would be less and there would be larger credit rationing in the bad credit market. Therefore,
all the good credit types will choose to go to the informed lenders.
The uninformed lenders’ profit isPRL − c − δ. If the uninformed lenders switch to screening, the profit would
bemin(PHRH − c− δ, 1 + α− c). The intramarket condition for the uninformed lenders is
min(PHRH − c− δ, 1 + α− c) ≤ PRL − c− δ
δ ≤ PRL − (1 + α)










































s = G s = B
1− α α
Figure 3: Market Equilibrium Whenδ ≤ PRL − (1 + α) and2− α ≤ PRL
ii) rB ∈ (RL, RH)
In this case, the interest rate in the bad credit market is1+α+δPH and the uninformed lenders profit is1 + α − c by
Corollary 1 and market clearing condition. The higher profit condition is
1 + α− c < PRL − c
1 + α < PRL
For this strategy to be an equilibrium, two more conditions must be satisfied. First, the intramarket condition in
the bad credit market must be satisfied. If the uninformed lenders switch to pooling, the profit would bePRL− c− δ.
Therefore, the intramarket condition is
PRL − c− δ < 1 + α− c
δ > PRL − (1 + α)
Second, there is a ceiling,RH , for the interest rate in the bad market.
1 + α + δ
PH
< RH















































Figure 4: Market Equilibrium WhenPRL − (1 + α) < δ < PHRH − (1 + α) and1 + α < PRL.
iii) rB = RH
When the interest rate in the bad credit market isRH , the profit of the uninformed lenders isPHRH − c− δ. To
satisfy the higher profit condition, the profit of the informed lenders, which isPRL − c, should be higher. Therefore,
the following condition holds.
PHRH − c− δ ≤ PRL − c
δ ≥ PHRH − PRL
In addition, the bad credit market should not be cleared. In other words, the demand (α) should be larger than the
supply (PHRH − 1− δ) because of Corollary 1.
PHRH − 1− δ ≤ α











































s = G s = B
1− α α
Figure 5: Market Equilibrium Whenδ ≥ PHRH −min(1 + α, PRL).
3. The informed lenders enter both markets and screen out the low risk types in both markets,ΨI = (S, S).
In this case, the profits from both markets should be equal. The profit in the good credit market isPHrG − c and
the profit in the bad credit market isPHrB − c − δ. Since those two profits should be equal owing to intermarket
condition, the interest rate in the good credit market must be lower than the interest rate in the bad credit market. The
upper bound for the interest rates isRH . This is because the interest rate in the bad credit market is always higher
than the interest rate in the good credit market, and the interest rate in the good credit market can never reachRH and
is always in the range of(RL, RH).
i) rB ∈ (RL, RH)
SincerB ∈ (RL, RH) andrG ∈ (RL, RH), owing to Corollary 1, both markets are cleared. The total demand is
1 and the total supply is2(PHrG − 1) = 2(PHrB − 1− δ). Therefore, the market clearing conditions are












δ < PHRH − 1.5
In addition, the intramarket condition must hold. The profits are1.5− c in both markets. If the informed lenders
in the good credit market switch to pooling, the profit would change toPRL − c. Therefore,
PRL − c < 1.5− c
PRL < 1.5













































Figure 6: Market Equilibrium WhenPRL < 1.5 and1.5 + δ < PHRH
ii) rB = RH
SincerB = RH and the profits in both markets are equal, the interest rate in the good credit market isRH − δPH
by intermarket condition. In order to set the interest rates to these points, the good credit market must be cleared and
the bad credit market must not be cleared. The demand in the bad credit market isα and the supply is2(PHRH − 1−
δ)− (1− α). Since the bad credit market is not cleared, the supply should be less than the demand.
2(PHRH − 1− δ)− (1− α) ≤ α
δ ≥ PHRH − 1.5
Now, we check the intramarket condition. If the informed lenders in the good credit market switch to pooling,
the profit would bePRL − c. If they keep screening, the profit would bePHRH − c− δ. Therefore, the intramarket
condition is
PRL − c < PHRH − c− δ
δ < PHRH − PRL
It is obvious that if above equation holds, the intramarket condition in the bad credit market also holds. Also, note
that if δ ≥ PHRH − 1.5 andδ < PHRH − PRL, PRL < 1.5.
By Lemma 4, the whole capital in the good credit market should be supplied solely by the informed lenders. The
total supply of capital by the informed lenders isPHRH − 1 − δ. The amount supplied in the good credit market is
1− α.
1− α ≤ PHRH − 1− δ









































s = G s = B
α1− α
rG
Figure 7: Market Equilibrium WhenPHRH − 1.5 ≤ δ ≤ PHRH − (2− α) andδ < PHRH − PRL
4. The informed lenders enter both markets and screen out the low risk types only in the bad credit market,
ΨI = (P, S).
Since the informed lenders enter both markets, the profits from both markets should be equal. Additionally, the
informed lenders choose to pool in the good credit market and their profit isPRL − c. Therefore,









δ < PHRH − PRL
Now, we check the intramarket condition for the informed lenders in the good credit market. In order for them to
have no incentive to switch, the supply should be more than the demand, when the informed lenders switch. Since the
profit is PRL − c, the total supply is2(PRL − 1) − α. Also the total demand is1 − α when the informed lenders
switch. Therefore, the intramarket condition is
1− α ≤ 2(PRL − 1)− α
1.5 ≤ PRL
In this equilibrium, the uninformed lenders have no choice but to screen out owing to Lemma 4. Therefore, the
amount supplied in the bad credit market must be less than the amount supplied by the uninformed lenders. The
amount supplied by the uninformed lender isPRL − 1 and the amount supplied in the bad credit market isα.
PRL − 1 ≤ α















































Figure 8: Market Equilibrium When1.5 ≤ PRL ≤ 1 + α andδ < PHRH − PRL.
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